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1. Introduction
Venture capitalists are widely regarded as financial intermediaries who provide not
just financing, but also advice and monitoring. This view rests on solid empirical
foundations: according to Gorman and Sahlman (1989), for example, lead venture
investors visit each portfolio company an average of 19 times per year, and spend
100 hours in direct contact (on site or by phone) with the company. Venture
capitalists play a very active role in negotiating with suppliers, helping to recruit
and compensate key individuals, replacing founders with outside CEOs, provid-
ing strategic advice and access to consultants, investment bankers and lawyers
(Gompers and Lerner (1999), Hellmann and Puri (2002), Lerner (1995), Kaplan
and Strömberg (2003, 2004), Sahlman (1990)).
This chapter develops a unified theoretical framework to analyse the impli-
cations of venture capitalists’ multiple roles as financiers, monitors and advisers.
The model is used to address three main questions:
(i) what is the optimal allocation of cashflow rights and control rights between
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists? Does this correspond to what is commonly
observed in venture capital contracts?
(ii) what are the different implications of venture capitalists’ roles as financiers,
monitors and advisors?
(iii) in what way does the desirability of deterring potential collusion between
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, at the expense of other investors, shape the
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structure of venture capital deals?
Each of these questions can obviously be investigated with a variety of ap-
proaches. The use of a single model to address all three questions has the ad-
vantage, beyond parsimony and simplicity, of exploring the connections between
these different issues. For example, how does the allocation of control rights and
cashflow rights affect incentives to monitor or advise relative to incentives to col-
lude? This is one of the issues addressed below. On the other hand, the three
questions set out above are very broad, and the answers generated here will be
necessarily (very) incomplete: other chapters in this volume will provide plenty
of additional insights.
The analysis developed below focuses on how financial contracts can be de-
signed to achieve several objectives that are particularly important in the venture
capital context. First, entrepreneurs need to be motivated to take efficient deci-
sions for the venture: this may entail the provision of significant effort, and the
willingness to sacrifice some personal benefits in order to increase the chances
of commercial success of the company. For example, an entrepreneur might be
tempted to pursue an investment project that he finds particularly interesting
(e.g. it was "his idea"), or one that could give him considerable personal prestige,
even though their expected profitability is much lower than for an alternative
project. It may be possible to solve this potential moral hazard problem and
provide appropriate incentives to the entrepreneur by giving him a sufficient mon-
etary stake in the venture; however, this reduces the returns available for investors,
and hence their willingness to contribute capital. When entrepreneurs are suffi-
ciently capital-constrained, as is often the case for innovative start-ups, they may
therefore turn to venture capitalists, who can alleviate the problem of entrepre-
neurial moral hazard through monitoring and intervention. This in turn leads to
a second objective for venture capital contracts: they also need to induce venture
capitalists to monitor efficiently.
As noted earlier, venture capitalists may play another valuable role, by provid-
ing advice on matters over which they have considerable knowledge and expertise.
For example, venture capitalists will typically know the industry very well, and
advice on strategic decisions, as well as helping to recruit key personnel. Thus a
third objective of venture capital contracts may be to induce venture capitalists to
provide advice efficiently. Finally, a crucial objective is to ensure that the venture
is liquidated if its future prospects become sufficiently poor, or, on the contrary,
that it is able to obtain the additional funding it needs to grow and invest when
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future prospects are sufficiently favourable1.
While this is by no means an exhaustive list of the objectives that need to
be taken into account in the design of venture capital contracts, it does capture
several of the key issues. Indeed, the need to elicit both entrepreneurial effort and
VC advice has been the focus of numerous recent contributions to the theoretical
literature on venture capital, as discussed in section 4, while the importance of
inducing the efficient decision to continue or liquidate is central to the work of, for
example, Admati and Pfleiderer (1994). The approach developed in this chapter
extends this literature in two key respects. First, by studying all the issues out-
lined above within a single theoretical framework, and exploring the connections
between them. Second, by identifying and exploring a crucial new factor in the
design of venture capital contracts: the need to ensure that entrepreneurs and
venture capitalists have no incentive to collude at the expense of other investors,
whether these investors be the limited partners in the venture capital fund, non-
venture investors involved at an early stage, or later-stage investors such as those
acquiring shares in the company at an IPO.
The need for contracts to be collusion-proof rules out a number of otherwise
feasible contracts. This makes it possible to obtain a number of implications, for
example concerning the optimal allocation of cashflow rights and control rights,
without imposing exogenous restrictions on the set of contracts that can be used.
In this respect, the approach developed here differs from the one adopted in a
number of contributions to the literature, which simply assume that contracts
will be incomplete and that general control (ownership) rights will have to be
allocated to the entrepreneur, the venture capitalist, or both (e.g. de Bettignies
(2008)). In this chapter, on the other hand, the efficient allocation of control rights
emerges endogenously through the analysis of optimal collusion-proof contracts.
This makes it possible to obtain implications about the optimal allocation of
specific control rights, which is consistent with observed practice in venture capital
contracts, as discussed in detail in section 3.
The approach developed below sheds light on a number of features of venture
capital financings, including:
(a) the widespread use of convertible securities, such as convertible debt
or preferred stock, especially in the US;
(b) the allocation of control rights over the decision to continue or liquidate
1As will be clear from this list, the analysis developed here is particularly relevant to com-
panies at the start-up and expansion stage, where monitoring by venture capitalists is most
valuable.
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the project to venture capitalists, through the use of redemption rights, combined
with negative covenants and staged financings;
(c) the certification role played by venture capitalists, whereby their de-
cision to continue the project and exercise their securities’ conversion option acts
as a credible "good" signal to other investors (e.g. in an IPO).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, based on
Dessi (2005). The theoretical analysis developed in Dessi (2005) focused on the
monitoring role of venture capitalists: this is studied in section 3. Advice (support)
is examined in section 4, which establishes how the results of section 3 are modified
if venture capitalists act purely as financiers and advisers - a case that has received
considerable attention in the theoretical literature, but in different settings. The
main innovation here is the analysis of how the possibility of collusion shapes
optimal financial contracts between entrepreneurs and financiers/advisers. Section
5 concludes.
2. The model
The model, based on Dessi (2005), has three types of agent: entrepreneurs, venture
capitalists (intermediaries) and investors. For simplicity, they are all assumed to
be risk neutral and protected by limited liability. There are two periods. At
the beginning of the first period, t = 0, each entrepreneur has the opportunity to
invest in a project, provided he can finance the required initial expenditure of value
C0. The interesting case, which will be the focus of our analysis, occurs when the
entrepreneur does not have enough capital to undertake the project on his own.
He can then seek finance from venture capitalists and/or other investors. In the
presence of such external financing, there is a potential moral hazard problem at
this stage, associated with the entrepreneur’s choice of project. At the end of the
first period, t = 1, a "good" or a "bad" state is realised; the state determines
the expected payoffs from continuing or liquidating the project. If the project
is continued, it requires further financing of value C1. It will then yield return
R > 0 at t = 2 if it succeeds, and zero otherwise. If the project is liquidated
at t = 1, it generates a liquidation value L. There may then be a second moral
hazard problem, associated with the decision to continue or liquidate the project.
The model is described in greater detail below.
Entrepreneurs
At the beginning of the first period, each entrepreneur possesses some capital,
Af < C0. He therefore needs to raise some external funds. At this point, there is
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substantial uncertainty about the returns that the project will generate. Some of
the uncertainty is resolved at t = 1, when the state, γ, is realised. The state may
be "good" (γG) or "bad" (γB ), where γG > γB > 0. If the project is continued,
it will either succeed, with probability γ, yielding verifiable returns R at t = 2, or
fail, yielding returns equal to zero. The state γ therefore represents the probability
of success in the second period.
The entrepreneur’s choice of project determines the probability of the good
(γ = γG) or bad (γ = γB) state occurring. Specifically, the entrepreneur chooses
between a "good" project, in which the good state occurs with probability pH
, and a "bad" project, in which the good state occurs with a lower probability
pL , but the entrepreneur obtains a private benefit of value B > 0 during the
first period. In what follows I denote by ∆p = pH − pL > 0 the increase in the
probability of the good state occurring associated with choosing the good project,
and by ∆γ = γG−γB > 0 the difference in the probability of success between the
good state and the bad state.
Venture Capitalists (Intermediaries)
Beyond providing capital, venture capitalists can perform one of two func-
tions, advising and monitoring, or both. Advising (or "support") entails a variety
of value-adding activities, such as helping to recruit and compensate key individ-
uals, working with suppliers and customers, and helping to establish tactics and
strategy. I shall formalise these by assuming that a venture capitalist can, by in-
curring a private cost ca > 0, increase the probability of the "good" state occurring
by q, where 1− pH > q > 0. Monitoring, on the other hand, enables the venture
capitalist to limit the scope for opportunistic behaviour by the entrepreneur. I
model this formally by assuming that, through monitoring, the venture capitalist
can reduce the entrepreneur’s private benefit from undertaking the bad project
to b, where B > b > 0. This alleviates the moral hazard problem associated with
project choice. It can be interpreted as a restriction on the scope for opportunistic
behaviour by the entrepreneur as follows: suppose there is a third project that
the entrepreneur could choose, identical to the bad project described above except
for a lower private benefit, of value b. Then by becoming informed, the venture
capitalist can identify the bad project yielding the large private benefit B, and
intervene to prevent the entrepreneur from undertaking this project. On the other
hand, monitoring is not perfect and cannot eliminate moral hazard altogether: the
entrepreneur can still choose the project with low success probability and private
benefits b.
Monitoring (intervention) entails a private cost cm > 0 for the venture cap-
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italist. Both costs, the cost of monitoring and the cost of advising, cannot be
contracted on. Appropriate financial incentives must therefore be provided to the
venture capitalist to induce him to engage in either activity. These will need to
take into account not only the need to compensate for the costs ca and cm, but
also any rents that venture capitalists may be able to earn because of the rela-
tive scarcity of financial intermediaries possessing both the skills and expertise
of venture capitalists and substantial capital. In particular, I shall denote by α
the gross expected rate of return on capital (per period), net of monitoring and
advising costs, demanded by venture capitalists at t = 0. The equilibrium value of
α will be determined by the interaction between supply and demand for venture
capital (see Dessi (2005) for details). Typically, this will exceed the rate of return
demanded by other investors, for the reason just given. Entrepreneurs will there-
fore raise from venture capitalists only the minimum amount of capital consistent
with obtaining their monitoring and/or advice. Any remaining need for external
finance will be met by turning to other investors.
Investors
In contrast to venture capitalists, other investors are assumed to be small
and/or to lack the necessary skills to become informed and intervene (monitor)
or advise. For this reason, I will often refer to them as "uninformed investors"
or "outside investors" in what follows. There are many of these uninformed in-
vestors in each period, so that it is always possible to raise finance from them by
offering them their required gross expected rate of return, which is normalised to
one. In the venture capital context, there are several possible interpretations of
"uninformed investors". First, these investors could be the limited partners in a
venture capital fund. Typically, these investors provide most of the fund’s capital,
but they are not closely involved with the portfolio companies and remain "unin-
formed" relative to the venture capitalist. A second possible interpretation of the
outside investors is that they represent non-venture investors, who are sometimes
brought on board by venture capitalists to participate in financing but without
becoming closely involved with the companies that receive the funds.2 A third
possible interpretation is that of new investors who acquire shares in the com-
pany when it is taken public, and who will be less informed at this stage than the
venture capitalist who has been involved with the company from the start.
The projects
To make the analysis interesting, I shall make the following assumptions.
2The involvement of nonventure investors in the financing of venture-backed companies is
documented for example by Gompers and Lerner (1999).
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(A1) γGR− C1 > L
Continuation is efficient at t = 1 in the good state.
(A2) γBR− C1 < L
Liquidation is efficient at t = 1 in the bad state.
(A3) q[γG(R− C1)− L] > ca
Advice is efficient.
(A4) pH(γGR− C1) + (1− pH)L ≥ C0 + cm
It is efficient to invest in the good project ex ante, even if it requires monitoring
and there is no advice.
(A5) B + (pL + q)(γGR− C1) + (1− pL − q)L < C0 + ca
It is never efficient to invest in the bad project.
Information
I shall assume that the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist observe the
realisation of γ at t = 1, but outside investors do not. This kind of informational
advantage for "insiders" relative to "outsiders" (as in, for example, Admati and
Pfleiderer (1994), Dessi (2005, 2007), Rajan (1992) and Schmidt (2003)) seems
very plausible in the case of entrepreneurial start-up companies. It captures the
idea that the venture capitalist has easier access to information about the firm’s
progress and prospects than outside investors, as well as the knowledge and ex-
pertise required to interpret the information correctly. Indeed, venture capitalists
typically concentrate their investments in industries or sectors that they know and
understand particularly well, having often worked in them (e.g. as entrepreneurs)
prior to becoming venture capitalists. This is likely to be especially important for
high-technology industries, where considerable technical expertise may be needed
to evaluate progress in the early stages of a venture.
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Figure 1: timeline
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
Financial contracts Realisation of γ. Project
signed. Decision to returns
Monitoring? continue or realised.
Entrepreneur chooses liquidate.
good or bad project.
Advice?
3. Monitoring
This section studies the case where venture capitalists engage in monitoring but
do not advise. Monitoring may entail a variety of interventions on the board of
directors (e.g. to recruit and change management3, which in turn affects the firm’s
strategy and the entrepreneur’s (founder’s) ability to pursue his preferred project).
I begin by assuming that collusion is never feasible. This assumption is then
relaxed to study how venture capital contracts can be optimally designed when
the possibility of collusion is allowed for. As we shall see, the resulting contracts
ensure that collusion does not occur in equilibrium; moreover, the allocation of
cashflow rights and control rights in these contracts is consistent with common
practice in the venture capital industry.
3.1. Collusion ruled out a priori
If entrepreneurs possess sufficient own capital, they can obtain the external finance
they require to undertake their project directly from uninformed investors, with
no need for (costly) monitoring (see Dessi (2005) for details). Since this entails no
role for venture capitalists, I shall focus instead on the case where entrepreneurs
have insufficient own capital, and cannot finance their project without monitoring
by a venture capitalist.
The venture capitalist’s informational advantage relative to other investors
means that there are two informed parties at t = 1, the entrepreneur and the
3On this see Kaplan and Strömberg (2004).
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venture capitalist. Ex ante, contracts can be designed to ensure that information
about the realised state γ will be obtained from these informed parties at t = 1,
and that the information will be used to make the efficient choice between contin-
uing and liquidating the project. In fact, when collusion is ruled out exogenously,
this can be achieved at no additional cost relative to a situation in which the
state γ is publicly observable and contractable; in other words, the informational
asymmetry between entrepreneur and venture capitalist on the one hand, and
outside investors on the other hand, need not impose any restriction on financing
possibilities relative to the case of symmetric information about the state. The
intuition for this is the following: if the two informed parties cannot collude with
each other, it is possible to induce them to reveal their information truthfully, by
providing incentives for one party to "call the other’s bluff" if the other lies. More
formally, we can rely on subgame perfect implementation to elicit information
about γ from the two informed parties without needing to increase their share of
project income in equilibrium.
This effectively removes any potential moral hazard problem ex post, associ-
ated with the decision to continue or liquidate the project. Ex ante, on the other
hand, the venture capitalist has to be given incentives to monitor, and the entre-
preneur incentives to choose the "good" project. This entails pledging to them
a sufficiently large share of the project’s returns in the event of success, R. In-
tuitively, efficient provision of incentives also implies that their returns should be
as low as possible when the project is liquidated (i.e. when the state γ is "bad");
specifically, they should be equal to zero, because of limited liability.
We therefore obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. Assume that γ is observed by the entrepreneur and the venture
capitalist at t=1 but not by outside investors, and that collusion is not feasible.
Then:
(i) the entrepreneur can undertake the good project if, and only if, Af ≥ A∗(α),
where A∗(α) is the critical threshold under symmetric information, and is given
by A∗(α) ≡ C0 − L− pH [γGR− C1 − L− ((b+ cm)/∆p)]− cmpL/α2∆p;
(ii) optimal contracts, which allow the project to be financed whenever Af ≥
A∗(α), have the following properties: (a) the equilibrium payoffs of the entrepre-
neur and the venture capitalist in the event of liquidation are equal to zero; and
(b) information about γ is obtained from the venture capitalist and the entrepre-
neur at t=1 through a sequential mechanism which requires their agreement for
the project to be continued.
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The critical threshold for entrepreneurial capital, A∗(α), reflects the need to
pledge part of the project’s returns in case of success to the entrepreneur, for
incentive reasons. This reduces the returns that can credibly be promised to
outside investors, and hence the capital that they are willing to contribute towards
funding the project. Of course, the venture capitalist can provide capital, but he
will require the expected rate of return α on the capital he provides. As noted
earlier, this will exceed the outside investors’ required rate of return as long as
venture capitalists’ skills and capital are relatively scarce in the economy, implying
some rents for venture capitalists. The need to provide these rents, as well as
compensation for the monitoring cost cm, further reduces the amount of project
income that can be pledged to investors. Thus higher values of α and/or cm
increase the critical threshold A∗(α).
The second part of the Proposition shows that, in general, optimal contracts
with asymmetric information between the informed "insiders" and the uninformed
outside investors and no possibility of collusion are not consistent with the fact
that venture capitalists typically hold convertible securities. These represent a
claim on at least some of the proceeds in the event of liquidation, which is not
consistent with Proposition 1(ii)(a). Moreover, the sequential mechanism required
to elicit information about γ cannot be interpreted as a convertible security.
The allocation of control rights over the liquidation decision that emerges in
these optimal contracts does embody an important feature of observed venture
capital contracts, namely the fact that the intermediary has the power to force
liquidation. This is consistent with the widespread use of redemption rights, dis-
cussed in detail below. On the other hand, the optimal contracts described by
Proposition 1 also require the entrepreneur to have the power to force liquidation.
The empirical evidence on this is less clear-cut. The reason is that the entrepre-
neur would typically need to have control of the board to initiate a liquidation;
moreover, he may need a voting majority to ensure that the decision is approved
(see Smith (2001) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)).4 In their study of 213 ven-
ture capital investments, Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) found that entrepreneurs
(founders) had the majority of the board seats in 14% of cases, and venture cap-
italists in 25% of cases. In the remainder of cases neither had control, implying
an important role for other board members; however, these were individuals mu-
tually agreed upon by the venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs (founders),
suggesting that they could not be counted upon to side systematically with the
4Board rights and voting rights can differ in venture capital contracts through the use of
explicit agreements on the election of directors (see Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)).
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latter. As for voting rights5, the same study revealed that entrepreneurs had a
voting majority in at most 24% of all financings, the corresponding figure for ven-
ture capitalists being 53%.6 This suggests that in many cases entrepreneurs do
not have the power to force liquidation.
Some intuition for the results described by Proposition 1(ii) can be obtained by
comparing them with those that would apply under symmetric information about
the state γ. In this case too, ex ante incentives could be provided by pledging to
the entrepreneur and to the intermediary a sufficiently large share of the project’s
success returns, and a zero share of any proceeds in the event of liquidation. Ex
post efficiency, on the other hand, could be guaranteed simply by specifying in
the contract the efficient continuation decision contingent on γ, since γ would
be contractable. However, when γ is only observed by the entrepreneur and the
venture capitalist, it is not directly contractable; the information has to be elicited
from the two informed parties.
There is some tension between the need to elicit information about γ and the
allocation of cashflow rights that would be optimal under symmetric information.
In particular, when the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist receive nothing
in the event of liquidation (all the proceeds go to uninformed investors), they
both always prefer continuation to liquidation, which might lead them to claim
that the state is good even when in fact it is bad. This potential problem can
be solved using a simple sequential mechanism, with the property that the en-
trepreneur and the venture capitalist share (sequentially) the control rights over
the continuation decision; in particular, each party can force liquidation, so that
continuation requires agreement. Notice though that this type of mechanism is
not collusion-proof: in the bad state, the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur
will have an incentive to collude to secure higher payoffs. This suggests that we
need to investigate the implications of allowing for the possibility of collusion.
5The calculation of voting rights is complicated by the fact that some of these are contingent
on subsequent management performance and stock vesting milestones or contingencies. Kaplan
and Strömberg deal with this difficulty by calculating both a minimum and a maximum number
of votes for the venture capitalists, depending on future contingencies, and the corresponding
votes for the entrepreneurs.
6These figures refer to the minimum contingency case, which tends to overestimate the control
rights of the entrepreneurs. In the maximum contingency case, venture capitalists have a voting
majority in 69% of all financings, and entrepreneurs have a voting majority in only 12% of
financings.
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3.2. Collusion deterred through contract design
It might be argued that we should just assume away the possibility of collusion a
priori, as was done above. Why? One argument in favour of such an assumption
might be that the entrepreneur is capital-constrained : where would he find the
resources necessary to induce the venture capitalist to collude ? This objection
does not seem convincing, since the entrepreneur will typically be able to generate
some private benefits for the venture capitalist, if he wishes, by using corporate
resources (including ideas, knowledge and information). He may, for example,
allow the venture capitalist to influence decisions concerning supplier contracts or
the recruitment of key employees, in a way that benefits the venture capitalist.
Indeed, there is plenty of empirical evidence showing that venture capitalists play
a very active role in negotiating with suppliers, recruiting senior management,
and providing entrepreneurs with access to consultants, investment bankers and
lawyers (Gompers and Lerner (1999), Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kaplan and
Strömberg (2003), and Sahlman (1990)). This kind of involvement by venture
capitalists could, in principle, facilitate collusion with entrepreneurs.
A more persuasive argument might be that venture capitalists will not be will-
ing to collude because they will be concerned about the possible damage to their
reputation. There are two aspects to this argument. First, there is the possibility
that investors might discover ex post that collusion has taken place. However, this
is unlikely if sufficient care is taken in choosing the form of the "favours". A good
example here, particularly in the case of high-technology start-ups, would be the
sharing of valuable knowledge and information that the entrepreneur possesses
and/or acquires in the early stages of the venture. Second, an intermediary who
systematically colludes with entrepreneurs instead of monitoring the projects will
build up, over time, a poorer track record for project success than an intermediary
who never shirks on monitoring. This will obviously affect his reputation in the
market and hence his ability to stay in business. While concern over such long-
term reputational effects will undoubtedly play a role, it seems unlikely that it
will provide, on its own, a sufficiently powerful deterrent to collusion at all times.
Thus simply ruling out the possibility of collusion by assumption does not seem
justified.
We now study instead how collusion can be deterred endogenously, through an
appropriate design of financial contracts. Note first that collusion may occur at
two different stages. The entrepreneur and the venture capitalist may collude ex
ante, at t = 0, so that the venture capitalist does not monitor, and the entrepre-
neur chooses the bad project yielding private benefits B. They may also collude
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ex post, at t = 1, so as to induce continuation even in the bad state, which gives
them strictly positive expected payoffs (unlike liquidation).
Ex-ante collusion would require some form of transfer (favour) from the en-
trepreneur to the venture capitalist, to induce the latter not to monitor. The
simplest way to capture the different possible ways in which collusive transfers
might occur is through a linear collusion technology: that is, by assuming that a
transfer which costs S to the giver benefits the receiver by an amount kS. We
assume that 1 ≥ k > 0 : the case where k < 1 implies the existence of transactions
costs of collusion, including, for example, the effect of reputational concerns as
discussed above, which would tend to reduce the benefit to the receiver. In prin-
ciple, the case where k > 1 cannot be ruled out: for example, the entrepreneur
might possess some private information that is potentially more valuable to the
venture capitalist than to himself. For simplicity, we focus attention on what we
consider to be the most plausible case, 1 ≥ k > 0. As for ex-post collusion, this
could occur even in the absence of any collusive transfers. The reason is that when
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist do not receive any of the proceeds in
the event of liquidation, both parties stand to gain from continuing the project in
the bad state, and can agree to coordinate on this outcome without any need for
favours.
The following result summarises the main implications of the need to deter
collusion through the design of venture capital contracts.
Proposition 2. Assume γ is observed by the entrepreneur and the venture
capitalist at t=1, but not by outside investors. Then:
(i) allowing for the possibility of collusion raises the minimum amount of en-
trepreneurial capital required to undertake the good project to:
A∗C(α) ≡ A∗(α)+pHk(B− b)[1− (1/α2)]/∆p+γB(c+kB)[1− (1/α2)]/∆p∆γ,
where A∗(α) is the critical threshold when collusion is not feasible, given in Propo-
sition 1;
(ii) optimal collusion-proof contracts, which allow the good project to be fi-
nanced whenever Af ≥ A∗C(α), have the following properties: (a) the venture
capitalist is given control rights over the decision to continue or liquidate the
project at t=1; and (b) the allocation of cashflow rights provides the venture cap-
italist with incentives to take the efficient continuation/liquidation decision; this
entails giving him a share of the proceeds in the event of liquidation.
Financing constraints are clearly exacerbated by the need to deter collusion.
This is because there are essentially two ways of deterring collusion: making
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it less attractive to the entrepreneur, which requires increasing his share of the
project’s expected income, or making it less attractive to the venture capitalist,
which requires giving him a greater share of the project’s expected income instead.
When the entrepreneur is sufficiently capital-constrained, the first option is not
feasible, as the entrepreneur cannot increase his capital contribution to make up
for the shortfall. The venture capitalist, on the other hand, can provide additional
capital to "pay" for his higher expected income from the project, but he will also
extract some rents (α > 1): this makes the financing constraint tighter (i.e. it
increases A∗C(α)).
Proposition 2(ii) shows that optimal collusion-proof contracts are consistent
with commonly observed characteristics of venture capital contracts. First, the
venture capitalist is given control rights over the continuation decision. In particu-
lar, he is given both the right and the incentives to liquidate the project in the bad
state. The intuition for this is as follows. The possibility of collusion means that
we can no longer implement the optimal continuation/liquidation decision while
reducing the two informed parties’ equilibrium payoffs in the bad state to zero
by giving one party the incentive to ”call the other’s bluff” as the parties would
collude to secure higher payoffs. The optimal continuation decision can only be
implemented (and collusion deterred) by increasing the entrepreneur’s and/or the
venture capitalist’s equilibrium payoffs in the event of liquidation. To minimise
the need for entrepreneurial capital, we rely on the second option. This implies
giving the venture capitalist the power and the incentives to liquidate the project
in the bad state. This is consistent with the use of redemption rights7 in venture
capital contracts: as Gompers (1997) notes, these rights imply that ”essentially,
the venture capitalists can force the firm to repay the face value of the investment
at any time. This mechanism can often be used to force liquidation”.8
Second, the allocation of cashflow rights is also consistent with common prac-
7Venture capitalists’ redemption rights can take one of two forms: mandatory redemption
rights and optional investor redemption (”put”) rights. Mandatory redemption requires the
company to begin repurchasing shares at a specified date, usually subject to waiver by the
venture capitalists. Optional investor redemption rights, which are much more common, allow
venture capitalists to force the repurchase of their shares at their discretion. They can typically
be exercised after a given date.
8With both types of redemption right, the venture capitalist essentially acquires liquida-
tion rights from a given date onwards. Earlier in the venture capital relationship, the venture
capitalist effectively controls the continuation / liquidation decision through the use of staged
financing and negative covenants. For a more detailed discussion, see Smith (2001) and Kaplan
and Strömberg (2003).
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tice in venture capital finance, where convertible securities (convertible preferred
equity and convertible debt) are the most commonly used financial instruments9.
In particular, under plausible assumptions, the venture capitalist’s payoffs can be
interpreted as the payoffs to a convertible security: a debt claim with face value
equal to his share of liquidation proceeds and an option to convert this to an eq-
uity share which will have the appropriate value at t = 2 if the project succeeds.
The values of the debt claim and the equity share are chosen so that the venture
capitalist has an incentive to continue the project and exercise the conversion op-
tion in the good state, while in the bad state he will prefer to liquidate without
exercising the conversion option.
One implication of this interpretation is that the intermediary’s decision to
continue and exercise the conversion option can act as a credible signal to un-
informed investors that the firm’s prospects are good: this too seems consistent
with the empirical evidence on venture capital financing. Continuation finance is
often raised through IPOs, and venture capitalists are required to exercise their
conversion option at this point. Megginson and Weiss (1991), in their study of
320 venture-backed and 320 nonventure IPOs over the period 1983-87, find that
venture capitalists retain a majority of their equity after the IPO, and that the
underpricing of venture-backed IPOs is significantly less than the underpricing of
nonventure IPOs. They interpret this as evidence that venture capitalists certify
to investors the quality of the firms they bring to market. Their argument for
this certification hypothesis is based on reputational considerations: the idea is
that venture capitalists have an incentive to build a reputation for bringing high-
quality firms to market, which in turn will reduce the costs of taking firms public
in the future. The results described above suggest that venture capitalists’ certi-
fication role does not rely only on reputation, but also on the design of financial
contracts, which provides the appropriate incentives for certification.
Finally, note that while the optimal collusion-proof contract can be imple-
9Convertible securities are the most commonly held securities by venture capitalists in the
US (see Gompers and Lerner (1999), Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)). Outside the US, a variety
of securities are used, notably in Canada (where common equity dominates), Europe, and in
developing countries. On this see Cumming (2005a, 2005b, 2006), Cumming et al. (2009),
Hege et al. (2003), Kaplan et al. (2003), Lerner and Schoar (2005) and Schwienbacher (2002).
Interestingly, Cumming (2005a), using Canadian data, finds that high-tech firms are more likely
to be financed with convertible preferred equity than other firms. High-tech firms, as discussed
earlier, may be particularly vulnerable to potential collusion problems; moreover, in view of the
high risks involved, the need to induce the efficient decision between continuation and liquidation
would seem to be especially important.
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mented with convertible securities or a combination of debt and equity, it cannot,
in general, be implemented with straight debt or straight equity : this may provide
an explanation for the difference between the financial claims typically held by
venture capitalists (convertible securities), and those held by business angels for
whom the possibility of collusion is not an issue (straight equity).10
4. Advising
This section examines the case where venture capitalists provide advice (e.g.
strategic advice, customer introductions) but do not monitor (intervene). This
case has been studied, in different settings, in a number of contributions, includ-
ing Bottazzi et al. (2005), Casamatta (2003), Cestone (2000), Hellmann (1998),
Kaplan et al. (2003), Lerner and Schoar (2005), Repullo and Suarez (2000, 2004),
and Schmidt (2003). The main novelty here is is the analysis of how the possi-
bility of collusion shapes optimal financial contracts between entrepreneurs and
financiers/advisers. As in the previous section, I begin by assuming that collusion
is never feasible. I will then relax this assumption and investigate the optimal de-
sign of contracts that deter collusion. I focus throughout on the more interesting
case where α is not too large, so that it is indeed in the entrepreneur’s interest to
obtain the venture capitalist’s advice.
4.1. Collusion ruled out a priori
If collusion is not feasible, we can once again design contracts that will elicit
information about the realised state γ from the entrepreneur and the venture
capitalist at t = 1, at no additional cost relative to the case where the state is
publicly observable and contractable. As in the monitoring case studied in the
previous section, this removes any potential moral hazard problem associated with
the decision to continue or liquidate the project. The venture capital contract then
needs to provide appropriate incentives ex ante: it needs to motivate the venture
capitalist to advise, and the entrepreneur to choose the good project. This yields
a very similar result to the one described by Proposition 1:
Proposition 3. Assume that γ is observed by the entrepreneur and the venture
capitalist at t=1 but not by outside investors, and that collusion is not feasible.
10See Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1998) on business angels and Gompers and Lerner (1999) and
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) on venture capitalists.
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Then:
(i) the entrepreneur can undertake the good project if, and only if, Af ≥
A∗∗(α), where A∗∗(α) is the critical threshold under symmetric information, and
is given by
A∗∗(α) = C0 − L− (pH + q)[γGR− C1 − L−B/∆p− ca/q]− capH/α2q;
(ii) optimal contracts, which allow the project to be financed whenever Af ≥
A∗∗(α), have the following properties: (a) the equilibrium payoffs of the entrepre-
neur and the venture capitalist in the event of liquidation are equal to zero; and
(b) information about γ is obtained from the venture capitalist and the entrepre-
neur at t=1 through a sequential mechanism which requires their agreement for
the project to be continued.
Intuitively, when collusion is ruled out exogenously, the main difference be-
tween advice and monitoring is simply that advice increases the project’s Net
Present Value (NPV), while monitoring decreases NPV but is nevertheless valu-
able because it relaxes financing constraints by reducing the share of expected
income that needs to be pledged to the entrepreneur for incentive reasons, hence
increasing pledgeable income.
4.2. Collusion deterred through contract design
Once we allow for the possibility of collusion, a further difference emerges between
advising and monitoring. If the venture capitalist’s role is to provide financing
and advice, but no monitoring, there is no scope for ex ante collusion between
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. There remains, on the other hand,
scope for collusion ex post. The reason is that the optimal contracts described
by Proposition 3 entail a payoff of value zero in the event of liquidation for both
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, while continuation would give them
positive expected payoffs. It is therefore in their interest to collude to ensure that
the project is continued even when the realised state γ is bad.
Taking this into account, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. Assume γ is observed by the entrepreneur and the venture
capitalist at t=1, but not by outside investors. Then:
(i) the minimum amount of entrepreneurial capital required to undertake the
good project once we allow for the possibility of collusion is given by:
A∗∗C (α) = C0−L−(pH+q)(γGR−L−B/∆p)+ca/α2+(1−1/α2)kγBB/∆p∆γ+
(1− 1/α2)πca/q∆γ;
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(ii) optimal collusion-proof contracts, which allow the good project to be fi-
nanced whenever Af ≥ A∗∗C (α), have the following properties: (a) the venture
capitalist is given control rights over the decision to continue or liquidate the
project at t=1; and (b) the allocation of cashflow rights provides the venture cap-
italist with incentives to take the efficient continuation/liquidation decision; this
entails giving him a share of the proceeds in the event of liquidation.
Clearly, the key result concerning the allocation of control rights and cashflow
rights that was obtained for the monitoring case also applies when the venture
capitalist provides advice rather than monitoring. In particular, the venture capi-
talist is given control rights over the decision to continue or liquidate the project,
and cashflow rights that provide the right incentives for him to exercise those
control rights efficiently. Once again, these cashflow rights can be interpreted as
payoffs to a convertible security. As discussed earlier in detail, these character-
istics are consistent with observed practice in the venture capital industry. The
results of this section show that they emerge as part of optimal collusion-proof
contracts not only when venture capitalists act as monitors, as in Dessi (2005),
but also when they act as advisers, as in a number of other recent contributions
to the literature.
5. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have explored some of the implications of venture capitalists’
roles as financiers, monitors and advisors. I have done this using a simple, unified
theoretical framework, which brings out the connections and differences between
monitoring and advising. The results show that some of the key findings on the
optimal allocation of control rights and cashflow rights in Dessi (2005), which
focused exclusively on venture capitalists’ role as monitors, also apply when we
consider instead their role as providers of advice and support. Of course, there are
many aspects of venture capitalists’ roles that are not captured here. For example,
their role in replacing founders with outside CEOs is not studied here: Hellmann
(1998) provides an excellent analysis. The provision of advice and support has
also been studied in a variety of settings, as noted at the beginning of section 4:
the contributions cited there provide many additional insights. One issue that has
received relatively less attention in the theoretical literature is the joint allocation
of control rights and cashflow rights. Some important exceptions include Cestone
(2000) and Hellmann (2000). Cestone focuses on the potential trade-off between
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the need to encourage entrepreneurial initiative in the early stages of a venture and
the need to elicit the venture capitalist’s support (help and advice) in later stages.
Hellmann examines the optimal allocation of cashflow rights and control rights
between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists when there is ex-ante uncertainty
as to whether exit should eventually occur through an acquisition or an IPO. In
view of the diversity, richness and complexity of venture capital financings (see,
among others, Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002), Gompers and Lerner (1999), Kaplan
and Stromberg (2003, 2004)), there remains nevertheless plenty of scope for further
research on these issues.
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6. Appendix
Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. See Dessi (2005).
Proof of Proposition 3.
Denote by C3 = {Af , Au, Am, Ψ, Lf , Lu, Lm, Rf , Ru, Rm} the contract pro-
posed by the entrepreneur to the venture capitalist and the uninformed investors
at t = 0. The subscript f refers to the entrepreneur, u to the uninformed investors,
and m to the venture capitalist. The first three terms represent each party’s ini-
tial capital contribution to the project; the next term denotes the mechanism that
will be played by the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist at t = 1 to elicit in-
formation about the state γ and implement the efficient continuation/liquidation
decision; the following three terms represent each party’s payoff in the event of
liquidation; the last three terms denote the payoffs if the project is continued and
succeeds.
The proof proceeds as follows: I first characterise the contract that would
make it possible to finance the good project with the lowest possible level of en-
trepreneurial capital in the presence of symmetric information; i.e. if the contract
could simply specify that at t = 1 the project will be continued when γ = γG and
liquidated otherwise. I will then give an example of a mechanism that makes it
possible to implement the same decision rule for project continuation/liquidation
without imposing any additional restriction, thereby completing the proof.
In the presence of symmetric information as just described, we can specify the
entrepreneur’s problem (P3) as follows:
Max (pH + q)γGRf + (1− pH − q)Lf −Af (6.1)
s.t. (pH+q)γGRf+(1−pH−q)Lf ≥ B+(pL+q)γGRf+(1−pL−q)Lf (6.2)
Rf +Ru +Rm = R (6.3)
Lf + Lu + Lm = L (6.4)
Af +Au +Am = C0 (6.5)
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(pH + q)(γGRu − C1) + (1− pH − q)Lu ≥ Au (6.6)
(pH + q)γGRm + (1− pH − q)Lm ≥ ca + pHγGRm + (1− pH)Lm (6.7)
(pH + q)γGRm + (1− pH − q)Lm − ca ≥ α2Am (6.8)
Expression (6.1) represents the entrepreneur’s expected payoff, while his in-
centive compatibility constraint is given by (6.2). Expressions (6.3) to (6.5) are
feasibility constraints, and (6.6) is the investors’ participation constraint. The ven-
ture capitalist’s incentive compatibility and participation constraints are given by
(6.7) and (6.8), respectively.
The method of proof is the following: first, obtain lower bounds for Rf , Rm, Lf
and Lm, using the entrepreneur’s and the venture capitalist’s ICCs, together with
limited liability. Second, using these lower bounds together with the participation
constraints, derive the minimum amount of entrepreneurial capital required for the
project to be undertaken. Notice that, since α2 ≥ 1, we can focus without loss
of generality on the case where the intermediary’s capital investment, Am, is just
equal to the minimum amount necessary to satisfy his participation and incentive
compatibility constraints; any additional external finance is raised directly from
investors.
From the entrepreneur’s ICC, together with limited liability, we have:
Rf ≥ B/∆pγG + Lf/γG (6.9)
Lf ≥ 0 (6.10)
and from the venture capitalist’s ICC, together with limited liability, we have:
Rm ≥ ca/qγG + Lm/γG (6.11)
Lm ≥ 0 (6.12)
Using the lower bounds implied by (6.11) and (6.12), and the venture capitalist’s
participation constraint, we obtain:
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Am = capH/α2q (6.13)
Using conditions (6.9) to (6.12), together with the feasibility constraints (6.3) and
(6.4), gives the following upper bounds for Ru and Lu :
Rmaxu = R−B/∆pγG − ca/qγG (6.14)
Lmaxu = L (6.15)
Hence the maximum amount of capital that can be raised from investors is
obtained from their participation constraint:
Amaxu = L+ (pH + q)[γGR− C1 − L−B/∆p− ca/q] (6.16)
Expressions (6.5), (6.13) and (6.16) together imply that the project can only be
financed if the entrepreneur’s capital satisfies the following condition:
Af ≥ A∗∗(α) = C0−L−(pH+q)[γGR−C1−L−B/∆p−ca/q]−capH/α2q (6.17)
When the above condition is satisfied, it can be easily checked that the following
is a solution to P3: let Af = A∗∗, Am = capH/α2q, Au = C0 −Af −Am, Lf = 0,
Lm = 0, Lu = L, Rf = B/∆pγG, Rm = ca/qγG, Ru = R−Rf −Rm.
Now consider the following mechanism Ψ:
• Stage 1 : the venture capitalist chooses between continuation and liquida-
tion. If he chooses liquidation, the project is liquidated; payoffs are Lf , Lu,
and Lm. If the venture capitalist chooses continuation, go on to stage 2.
• Stage 2 : the entrepreneur decides whether to agree with the venture cap-
italist or disagree. If he agrees, the project is continued, investors provide
the required finance C1, and payoffs are Rf , Ru, and Rm if the project suc-
ceeds; zero otherwise. If the entrepreneur disagrees, the project is liquidated;
the entrepreneur receives γBRf + , the investors any remaining liquidation
proceeds, and the venture capitalist zero.
For Ψ to work, it has to satisfy the following conditions:
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γGRf ≥ γBRf +  (6.18)
γBRf +  ≥ γBRf (6.19)
Lm ≥ 0 (6.20)
γGRm ≥ Lm (6.21)
The first two conditions ensure that in stage 2 the entrepreneur agrees if γ =
γG, and disagrees if γ = γB. The last two conditions ensure that in stage 1 the
intermediary prefers to liquidate if γ = γB and to continue if γ = γG. Clearly 
can always be chosen to satisfy the first two conditions. Comparing the last two
conditions with those for problem P3, given above, shows that they impose no
additional restriction: it is therefore possible to implement the lower bounds for
Rf , Rm, Lf , and Lm obtained earlier. Thus the minimum level of entrepreneurial
capital required for the project to be feasible satisfies the condition:
Af ≥ A∗∗(α) (6.22)
as in the case of symmetric information.
Proof of Proposition 4.
The entrepreneur at t = 0 proposes a contract C4 = {Af , Au, Am, Ψ, Lf ,
Lu, Lm, Rf , Ru, Rm} to the venture capitalist and the uninformed investors.
The difference with contract C3 in Proposition 3 is that the contract needs to be
collusion-proof. Once we allow for the possibility of collusion, the entrepreneur
and the venture capitalist can always agree to make the same announcements
when γ = γB as when γ = γG, giving the outcome {continuation, success payoffs
Rf , Rm} with expected payoffs equal to γBRf , γBRm. Thus it is no longer possible
to implement the equilibrium payoffs that were optimal when collusion was ruled
out a priori. To implement the optimal continuation/liquidation decision while
minimising the returns pledged to the entrepreneur (hence minimising the need
for entrepreneurial capital), we must have:
Lf = 0 (6.23)
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and set Lm so that the venture capitalist prefers liquidation to continuation
when γ = γB (in particular, so that he cannot be induced to collude with the
entrepreneur to choose continuation):
Lm ≥ γBRm + kγBRf (6.24)
The venture capitalist’s ex ante ICC (see below) requires that he prefer continu-
ation when γ = γG (otherwise he has no incentives to advise). Without loss of
generality we can therefore specify the mechanism Ψ as follows:
• at t = 1 the venture capitalist decides whether to continue the project or
liquidate it. If the project is liquidated, the entrepreneur receives Lf = 0,
the venture capitalist Lm = γBRm + kγBRf , and the investors any remain-
ing liquidation proceeds. If the project is continued, investors provide the
required finance C1, and payoffs are given by Rf , Ru, Rm (0) in the event
of success (failure).
The venture capitalist’s ex ante ICC is given by
(pH + q)γGRm + (1− pH − q)Lm ≥ ca + pHγGRm + (1− pH)Lm (6.25)
The lower bounds for Rf and Lf are the same as in Proposition 3, and are given
by (6.9) and (6.10), implying that the lower bound for Rm is given by (6.11);
substituting for Lm using (6.24) gives the following condition:
Rm ≥ ca/q∆γ + γBkB/γG∆p∆γ (6.26)
Let Rminm = ca/q∆γ + γBkB/γG∆p∆γ. Then the amount of capital provided
by the venture capitalist is equal to:
Am = [(pH + q)γG+(1−pH − q)γB]Rminm /α2+(1−pH − q)kγBB/α2∆pγG− ca/α2
(6.27)
Further manipulation shows that the project can be financed if and only if Af ≥
A∗∗C (α), where
A∗∗C (α) = C0−L−(pH+q)(γGR−L−B/∆p)+ca/α2+(1−1/α2)kγBB/∆p∆γ+(1−1/α2)πca/q∆γ
(6.28)
and π ≡ (pH + q)γG + (1− pH − q)γB.
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